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SOME INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW*

Paul R. Trigg, Jr.t

T

HE recent enactment of community property law in Michigan and
other states has created new problems for lawyers. Not the least of
these is the question of the income tax consequences which flow from
the existence of a community between the spouses. Nor is this the type
of problem which can be shrugged off by reference to tax counsel.
Local community property law and federal .income tax law are too
closely enmeshed to be intelligently divided. No authority is needed
for the statement that recently enacted community property laws are a
product of high surtaxes. At the same time, these laws of necessity
have far-reaching effects upon the status of spouses and their property
rights. Whenever there is a community property problem, there will
probably be a federal tax problem. The basic legal propositions which
underlie the impact of tax upon members of a community should be of
interest to all lawyers.
As everyone knows, the community, as a potent factor under the
income tax laws, derives its sanction from the case of Poe v. Seaborn.1
The case has many unusual asp~cts. But its doctrine has been implicitly
reaffirmed in Commissioner v. Harmon 2 and, presumably, Poe v. Seaborn will remain the law until such time as Congress makes a change by
appropriate legislation.
The case itself arose under the community property laws of the
state of Washington. The only issue was whether the· taxpayer was
required to include in his taxable income his wife's community share in
his earnings from personal services and the yield on their community
property. As in most other COJ.llmunity property states, the Washington
statute vested broad powers of management and control over these
items in the husband. The court dealt with the question in surprisingly

*

The federal estate and gift tax aspects of community property law are dealt with
in Pedersen, "Application of Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Law to Community
Property," 45 M1cH. L. REV. 409 (1947).-Ed.
A.B., J.D., University of Michigan; member of the Detroit bar.
1
282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
2
323 U.S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
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simple terms. It was said that under Washington law the wife was the
unqualified owner of one half of these items at the time of inception. 8
Since the revenue law 4 did not purport to tax A upon the income of B,
the court concluded that the husband was not properly taxable upon
his wife's share of any income item which, under local property law,
was at all times vested in his wife. Poe v. Seaborn is a curious mutation
in an environment which produced Lucas v. Earl/ H elvering v.
Horst,6Helvering v. Clifford," Harrison v. Shaffner 8 and other cases.
The key to the decision is the concept of ownership employed by the
court. It is a substantially different concept than that to which we are
accustomed under the Internal Revenue Code.9 It is familiar law that
mere title, as established under local law, is not necessarily a categorical
criterion of taxability. In the case of income derived from principal, the
test has usually been, who owns the principal. But the answer to the
question has- generally involved a more sophisticated approach than
recourse to local property law. For federal tax purposes, ownership is
normally considered to be the aggregate of rights as respects use and
enjoyment of the property.10 This doctrine, adapted to compensation
for personal services, becomes,an inquiry into who earned the compensation. In Poe v. Seaborn, these approaches were considered and rejected by the court. Mr. Seaborn's broad powers of management and
control over hi_s wife's share of his earniµgs were said to have no legal
significance for tax purposes. It is both interesting and puzzling to
compare the quantum of rights vested in the taxpayer in Poe v. Seaborn
and Helvering v. Clifford. In Washington the husband has the power
to dispose of community property during marriage as if it were his own
8

Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 P. III (1916); Mabie v. Whittaker, IO
Wash. 656, 39 P~, 172 (1895); Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 20 S. Ct. 404
(1900).
4
In this case §§ 210(a) and 211 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L.
9 at 21. Relevant current provisions are I.R.C., §§ II and IZ.
5
281 U.S. III, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930). A husband's anticipatory assignment of
compensation which under local law vests it in his wife without his intermediate ownership has no standing for income tax purposes. _
6
31i U.S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144 (1940). The assignment of accrued but unpaid
interest by a taxpayer who owns the underlying principal obligation does not shift the
tax burden to the assignee.
1 309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940). As subsequently amplified by lower court
decisions, the case stands for the proposition that the grantor of a trust may be taxable
on its income notwithstanding that under local law the beneficiary is recognized as sole
owner of the income.
·
8
3u U.S. 579, 61 S. Ct. 759 (1941). A life tenant may not escape tax on trust
income by anticipatory assignment of a short-term interest therein.
9
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940); Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940); and see I.R.C., §§ 166 and 167.
10 This concept, of course, is not confined to the federal income tax ~eld.
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property.11 Mr. Clifford was the donor of a short-term trust and also
its trustee. While his. powers as respects the trust corpus were possibly
as broad as Mr. Seaborn's rights over the community property, they
were certainly no broader, and subsequent applications of the Clifford
doctrine by the lower courts have demonstrated that it applies where
the grantor's retained rights are only a diluted version of the husband's powers of management in the community property states.1:i The
bemused observer must conclude that there is some element peculiar to
community property law which otherwise has no counterpart in local
property law. The facetious will say that there is and that Poe v. Seaborn supplied this element. Those more seriously inclined may be
satisfied with the reference made in both Poe v. Seaborn and Commissioner v. Harmon to the antiquity of the community property system.
Since the test of taxability laid down in Poe v. Seaborn is ownership
of the income item at inception under local community property law, it
could be expected that the lower federal courts, in applying the test,
would find themselves at the outset dealing with pure questions of
community property law unembarrassed by the normal doctrine that
title, ownership and kindred concepts frequently have a different meaning for federal tax purposes than for local property law purposes. And
in the main, this has been so. Indeed, if the opinions are to be believed,
this is always so. This approach is of considerable significance for more
than one reason. The law of community property, originally unified in
character, has acquired distinctive characteristics in the several states
where it now prevails.18 In some, it consists principally of what may be
called, for want of a better term, the common law of community property.u In other states, there are more or less elaborate statutory statements of community property law.15 The important point is that the
taxable consequences of a given transaction may not be and frequently
are not the same in all community property states. Hence, the federal
cases in the field of income taxation are now precedent in Michigan
11

Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 20 S. Ct. 404 (1900).
Helvering v. Elias, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 171. In discussing the
application of the doctrine originally laid down in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940), the court observed that " ••• it is only when the term is
longer than six or seven years ••• that the settlor's legal reservation of control becomes
vital••.•"
18 See 2 DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 526 et seq. (1943)
for the statutory provisions in the several community property states.
14
By this is meant the case law filling in the interstices of a loosely knit statutory
sysfem or based solely on the historical concept of the community in states where it has
been a factor in property law. See I DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 73, 74 (1943).
15
E.g. Michigan. See Mich. Pub. Acts (1947) No. 317, -effective July 1, 1947.
12
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only to the extent that the Michigan community property law receives
a construction parallel to the construction given the law in the state
where the federal case arose. A simple example will suffice·. In Texas,
income derived during marriage from the separate property of the
spouses is community income.16 The rather elaborate tests to determine
the extent to which distributable income from partnerships or sole proprietorships is allocable to the husband's separate capital investment
as opposed to his personal efforts 17 have no significance in Texas. Conversely a ruling that dividends on securities purchased by the husband
p;rior to marriage are taxable to the spouses half and half in Texas 18
has no significance in Michigan. In preparing this article it has been
assumed that except as specifically modified by the Michigan statute,
the so-called common law of community property now prevails in
Michigan.19
It will be readily realized that Poe v. Seaborn modifies a large
number of standard income tax concepts in a community property state.
To facilitate discussion, it is advisable at the outset to recognize the distinction between a legal community and a consensual community as
drawn in' Commissioner v. Harmon 20 and divide the discussion into
two broad categories. The first category consists of the income tax
questions attendant upon the creation, the duration and the dissolution
of a legal community. The second categary consists, essentially, of exploring the basic distinction between a legal community and a consensual community since communities of the latter· type are treated, for
all practical purposes under the income tax law, as though no community exist~d.21

I
THE LEGAL COMMUNITY; INCOME TAX PROBLEMS INCIDENT
-To ITs CREATION

Normally the event creating a community is marriage. Acquisition
of domicile -in a community property state by the spouses also creates
16

Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S.W. (2d) 152 (Hj31).
See P: 6 et seq., infra.
18
Mellie Esperson Stewart, 35 B.T.A. 406- (1937). See Anna Davis Terry, 26
B.T.A. 1418 (1932).
19
Stated otherwise, where a given situation is not expressly covered by the
Michigan statute, it is assumed that the Michigan courts will accept. as controlling
authority precedent in other states which haye community property systems where
such precedent has a "common law'' character. See note 14, supra. This may be' a
rather generous assumption. See Schedule to the Michigan Constitution of 1835, § 2;
Schedule to the Michigan Constitution of 1?·50, § l; Schedule to the Michigan Constitution of 1908, § 1; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug: (Mich.) 183 at 188 (1845); May v.
Rumney, l Mich. lat 4 (1847).
.
20
,323 U.S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944). And seep. 14 et seq., infra.
21
Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
17
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a community. In Michigan and other states, communities were c;:reated
wholesale when new community property laws became effective. In
general, the income tax problems which arise by reason of the creation
of the community are common to all legal communities regardless of
how created. Unfortunately, communities are not conveniently created
on the first day of the taxable period. Hence, there arises the not unfamiliar problem of having part of the taxable year governed by one
status and part of the taxable year governed by another.22
For present purposes, these problems will be dealt with in terms
of the creation of a community in Michigan on July 1, 1947. The principles applicable will be equally applicable to the creation of a community as a result of marriage at any time during the taxable year.
The general rule is that items of. income paid or accrued after July
r, 1947, which are community income under local law, are taxable half
and half to the spouses.28 There are exceptions to this rule. The cases
seem to hold that whether the spouses elect to return income on the
accrual basis or on the cash receipts and disbursements basis, the creation of the community puts both of them on a modified accrual basis.24
An example of this will be the December, 1947 bonus to the corporate executive. Plans for bonus compensation vary widely in character. Bonuses may be entirely at the discretion of the board of directors
or may be the result of a contractual arrangement between the corporation and an employee. In ~ither event, it seems that year-end bonuses
in l 947 will, as a general rule, be apportioned as between communi'ty
property and the separate property of the executive receiving the
bo~us.25 This conclusion is based upon the theory that in almost all instances the husband receives his bonus for services rendered to the
corporation throughout its current fiscal period.26 In Wrightsman v.
Commissioner 21 the taxpayer and his wife owned and dominated a corporation for which the taxpayer worked under a loose arrangement
whereby he would be compensated by the directors at the end of the·
calendar year in the light of corporate profits for the year. The
spouses resided in Oklahoma 28 but on December 24, they established
It should be unnecessary to add that the creation of a community in the middle
of a twelve-month taxable period does not result in a short taxable year for purposes of
filing returns.
28
I.T. 3782, INT. REv. BuL, 1946-4-12237.
24
W. L. Honnold, 36 B.T.A. 1190 (1937); Sara R. Preston, 35 B.T.A. 312
(1937). The conclusion is said to be based upon community property law principles.
25
Wrightsman v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1940) II I F. (2d) 227. ·
26
The corporation's bonus plan is normally integrated with its fiscal period which
may or may not be co-extensive with the executive's taxable year.
27
(C.C.A. 5th, 1940) I I I F. (2d) 227,
28
The taxable year involved antedated enactment of a community property law
valid for income tax purposes.
·

22
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their domicile in Texas. In December 30 the directors voted to pay the
taxpayer compensation of $50,000 for his services for the year. It was
held that only 8/365ths of the taxpayer's compensation constituted
community property. The rationale of the opinion seems to be that the
taxpayer "acquired" his compensation as he earned it regardless of
when received. The analogy made in the opinion to the acquisition of
land by adverse possession is somewhat forced since it logically leads to
the conclusion that the taxpayer's compensation was either all community property or all separate property.20 The rule in the Wrightsman case should apply to a bonus based on a percentage of profits notwithstanding that at July 1, 1947 the corporation's operations for the
first six months shows a deficit in earnings. The theory is that however
late in the corporate accounting period the bonus becomes a matter of
right to the executive, it is nevertheless paid in consideration of his
services for the entire accounting period. Of course, where the corporation is on a fiscafperiod other than a calendar year the apportionment
will be governed accordingly. There is an exception to this rule which
is consistent with the theory underlying it. Where it can be d,emonstrated that the bonus is paid in consideration of services other than
those rendered prior to the creation of the community, no part of the
bonus is the separate property of the husband. 80 These basic rules apply
to ordinary compensation in those cases where July 1, 1947 falls in the
middle of the pay period, or whenever a spouse has earned but not
received compensation for personal services at the time a community is
created.81 And it has been held that a wife may not escape tax on her
half of her husband's compensation, earned but unreceived, by making
an assignment thereof to her husband.82 These problems do not exist in
Michigan as respects yield on principal held by one spouse on July 1,
1947; the yield is separate property under local law.83
, A problem which is perennial throughout the existence of the community, but which :first occurs in the taxable period within which the
community is created, is that of segregating separate income from community income in the case of partnerships or sole proprietorships existing prior to the creation of the community. The problem arises because
the husband's income from principal owned by him at the creation of
the community continues to be his separate income in ~any community
1-

.,

OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 154, 155 (1943).
(C.C.A. 9th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 686.
31
I.T. 3792, INT. REv. BuL. 1946-8-12289.
32 Johnson v~ United States, (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 125.
38
Sections 1(a) and 2(a), Mich. Pub. Acts (1947) No. 317.
Z9
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° Fooshe v. Commissioner,
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states, including Michigan.84 There are many business enterprises,
whether in the form of partnerships or sole proprietorships, where capital is a substantial income-producing factor. In such cases ,profits are in
part earnings on capital invested and in part attributable to the personal
efforts of the partner or proprietor. If the latter, they are community
income; if the former, they are the separate income of the partner or
proprietor. This problem must be distinguished from the status of unwithdrawn earnings of a partnership or a proprietorship existing,at July
r, r 947. These constitute the separate property of the partner or proprietor whenever withdrawn, and, indeed, are his separate property·
whether withdrawn or not.85 The cases and rulings are not entirely
harmonious on the issue of allocation. The Treasury has developed
an unusual formula for segregating income earned on capital invested
and that attributable to personal efforts.8e A reasonable rate of return is
assumed on the capital. A reasonable rate of compensation is then assumed for the partner or proprietor. The aggregate of these two items
is not necessarily, perhaps not even normally, equivalent to the net
profits of the proprietorship or partnership for the taxable period. But
the ratio of each hypothetical factor to the sum of the hypothetical factors is applied to net profit for the taxable period to determine proper
segregation as between return on capital and compensation for personal
efforts. This method has been sustained.87 But other methods have
been used. Where the partnership books reflect partners' salaries, this
has been held the measure of return for personal services and the balance treated as return on capital.88 In another case the going rate on investments was applied to invested capital to determine the separate income of the proprietor. The balance was said to be attributable to his
personal efforts and, hence, community property.89 It is difficult to
justify the view stated in G.C.M. 9825 40 except in cases where it is
impossible to determine the relative earning potential of capital and
personal effort in an enterprise other than on an artificial basis. Perhaps
84
Sections 1(a) and 2(a), Mich. Pub. Acts (1947) No. 317; Arizona Rev. Code
(1939) § 63-302; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) §§ 162, 1.93; 2 Nev. Comp. Laws
(Hillyer, 1929) § 3355; New Mexico Ann. Stat. (1941) §§ 68-304, 68-303; Wash.
Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932) §§ 6890, 6891.
,
35
Such earnings are clearly property owned by the partner-spouse at the date of
the creation of the community. See§ 1(a), Mich. Pub. Acts (1947) No. 317.
86
G.C.M. 9825, 10 INT. R.Ev. BuL. 146 (1931).
87
J. Z. Todd, 3 T.C. 643 (1944).
38
Julius and Rebecca B. Shafer, 2 B.T.A. 640 (1925); Roy F. Wilcox, T.C.
Mem. Op., 5 C.C.H. TAX CoURT MEM. DEc. 412, P-H T.C. MEM. DEc. ff 46,072
(1946).
89
Lawrence Oliver, 4 T.C. 684 (1945).
40 See note 36, supra.
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the rulings and decisions may be harmonized by the time-hono~ed
dodge of resorting to the facts in each case. Where} under the circumstances, it appears impossible to demonstrate allocation by reasonably
persuasive evidence, the artificial approach is justifiable, if only on the
grounds that the commissioner's determinations are presumptively correct, and no satisfactory evidence is available to the taxpayer to rebut
the presumption. Moreover, it is probably fair to say that where the
partners inter se have placed a value on the personal services rendered
by one or more of them, this is the best evidence of that, value for the
purposes.
There may be, of course, miscellaneous items of income received by
one of the spouses during the last half of r 947 with respect to which
the~e are doubts as to its status as separate or community income.
Moreover, it may be that the solution as to status under local law is not
, finally determinative for income tax purposes. The Michigan act
predicates status upon "acquisition" after creation of the community,
and it is certainly an arguable question as to whether the term carries
with it the inexorable application of the accrual concept. Domicile being
what it is, there is a strong flavor of tax avoidance in cases like Wrightsman v. Commissioner and only those who are methodically ignorant
of what everyone knows would deny that this factor influences decisions. If "acquisition" as used in the Michigan statute be construed to
mean reducing the income item to possession and enjoyment, then Poe
v. Seaborn prohibits application of Wrightsman v. Commissioner and
similar cases in Michigan unless the doctrine of the latter case be justified as a proper exercise of the commissioner's power to put the taxpayer on an accounting system truly reflecting net income.
\

II
Tlrn LEGAL CoMMUNITY; INCOME TAx PROBLEMS INCIDENT
TO I TS EXISTENCE

In general, items of gross income received during coverture are apt
to fall within one of several broad classifications. They inay be compensation for personal services, gain from the disposition of capital items
which have appreciated in value since date of acquisition, yield in the
form of interest, dividends and rent on capital items, or net profits of
an individual proprietorship or corporation. The problem of allocating
net profits of an enterprise as between a spouse's capital investment and
his personal efforts remains a problem throughout the existence ·of the
community and the enterprise. n Yield on capital items is taxed as community income or as separate income of one of the spouses in accordance
n See p. 6 et seq., supra.
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with the status of the capital items as separate property or community
property under the Community Property Act. Compensation for personal services is community property and taxed as such. The gain from
the disposition of a capital item turns upon the status of the item as
community property or separate property of one of the spouses. If the
former status, the gain is taxable half and half to the spouses; if the
latter, it is taxable to the spouse to whom the capital item belongs as
separate property.
Section 8 of the Commuµity Property Act empowers the spouses in
broad, general terms to give or sell to one another existing community
interests in property. Presumably this section will be frequently invoked. It is not uncommon to find that the husband, at the date of creation of the community, is engaged in a program of saving through the
device of acquiring assets on a deferred or installment payment basis.
An existing policy of whole life insurance is an example. The purchase
of real property under an executory land contract is another. In the
typical situation of this type, the husband must have recourse to his
compensation for personal services to meet installment payments falling
due after creation of the community. This may and frequently does
lead to undesirable consequences under the community property law
which are not within the scope of this article.42 To foreclose these
results, it is anticipated that many lawyers will advise the spouses to
give single or cross-conveyances under section 8 of the act annually or
oftener to maintain the separate character of items of this type. The
conveyance by a wife to her husband of her community interest in assets
purchased with her husband's compensation for services is a gift 48 but
not taxable as such.44 But income tax difficulties may arise in connection
with cross-conveyances between the spouses. A transaction of this type
may result in capital gain to one of the spouses.45 It cannot,- of course,
result in capital loss to either spouse.46 If the transaction be treated as
an exchange between the spouses, one or the other will most certainly
end up with ·gain unless the community interests transferred have
equivalent fair market values.47 It is theoretically possible to argue that
42 E.g., where a husband carries life insurance naming his dependent mother as ·
the beneficiary and pays premiums from community funds. Upon the death of the
wife, her heirs would have an interest in the cash surrender value of the policy. In
the event of the husband's prior death, the wife would have an interest in the proceeds
of the policy.
48 In the sense of a voluntary conveyance or transfer of property not founded on
consideration. BouvrnR's LAw DICTIONARY, Baldwin's 1934 ed., 467.
44 I.R.C., § 1000( d) ; Pedersen, "Application of Federal Income, Estate and Gift
Tax Laws to Community Property," 45 MICH. L. REv: 409 at 437 (1947).
45
Johnson v. United States, (C.C.A_. 9th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 125.
46
I.R.C., § 24(b).
47 Unless, of course, the transaction falls within one of the nonrecognition provi-
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the transaction is a transfer for inadequate consideration and, hel}.ce, a
gift 48 to the extent of excess of value received by one spouse. In such
event, no gift tax·would be incurred if the excess of value was realized
. as a result of receipt of a community interest in property purchased
with the recipient's compensation for personal services or separate property.49 Whether this theory would insulate the gaining spouse from income tax is ceftainly questionable. Section 22 (b) (3), I.R.C. excludes
gifts from g.r:oss income, but under the circumstances assumed the excess
value is not a gift for gift tax purposes. And no gift of foresight is required to J>redict that the courts would be reluctant to find the trans. actions a gift within section 22 (b) (3) I.R.C. There would seem to be
no question where the excess value is subjected to gift tax, e.g., where
value passes from the spouse who purchased the property involved
from his compensation.50
High surtaxes inspired many husband and wife partnerships that
still exist. They present special problems under the Community Property Act. In the typical situation where the wife's partnership activities
are those of a passive investor, her share of distributable earnings will
continue to be her s(!parate property. In the case of the husband who is
both an investor and a manager, his distributable share of earnings are
in part community property and in part separate property. There is
nothing in the doctrine of Commissioner v. Tower 51 and Lusthaus v.
Commissioner 52 which suggests that the tax benefits of community
property will be denied the spouses with respect to that portion of the
husband's distributive share which constitutes community property
under local law. But is. it a necessary corollary that distributions to the
wife, heretofore taxable to the husband under Commissioner v. Tower,
are now require'd to be taxed to the wife because of the enactment of
the Community Property Act? The answer to this seems clear. The
wife's ownership of her interest in the partnership and her title to her
share of distributable earnings received by her as a partner are not
affected in any real way by the Community Property Act. Since her
distributable share was taxable to her husband prior to July I, I947
under Commissioner v. Tower, and since the status of these distributions has not been altered by the enactment of the community property
law, it is fair to assume that distributions to her after Jqly I, r947 will
sions of the code. See I.R.C., § u2(b)(1).
48
See I.R.C., § 22(b)(3).
49
Pedersen, "Application
of Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Laws to Com1
munity Property," 45 M1cH. L. REV. 409 at.437 (1947).
f>O Assuming; of course, that the transaction can be classified as a gift and not an
exchange at arm's length.
·
51
327 U.S. 280, 66 S. Ct. 532 (1946).
52
327 U.S. 293, 66 S. Ct. 539 (1946).
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likewise be taxable to her husband. Tenuous support can be found for a
contrary view. It is perhaps arguable that the effect of Senate Enrolled
Act r 3 6 was to make her separate ownership "an incident of marriage
by the inveterate. policy of the State." 58
What about husband and wife partnerships created after July r,
1947? If the wife, as a passive investor, supplies capital from community funds resulting from her personal compensation, her share of the
partnership earnings would be community property under the Michigan
Act, and Poe v. Seaborn seems to require that it be taxed half to her and
half to her husband. If we can accept the distinction between Lucas v.
Earl and Poe v. Seaborn we should not gag over the distinction between the latter case and Commissioner v. Tower. Moreover, there is
no out for the commissioner in allocating partnership earnings between
capital contribution and compensation for the working husband since
under the assumed facts both items would constitute community property under local law.
But suppose the husband endorses his salary check to his wife by
way of gift and she invests these funds in a partnership between herself
and her husband. Under the community property law the wife's share ·
of distributable earnings from the partnership would be her separate
property.5¼ But here, it is believed, Commissioner v. Tower would require that her distributable share be taxed one half to her husband.
While no cases can be cited for this conclusion, it is difficult to reach any
other conclusion. As to one half of her capital investment, the wife
acquired it by gift from her husband and she has rendered no vital
additional services to the partnership. Hence as to her half of her
distributable earnings, her situation necessarily falls categorically within the rule of Commissioner v. Tower and Lusthaus v. Commissioner.
Poe v. Seaborn recognizes the other half of her capital investment to
have been hers from inception; i.e., she did not acquire it by gift from
her husband.
Here, as in connection with the creation of the community, there
will be miscellaneous items of income received by one of the spouses
with respect to which there are doubts as to its status under local law.
In many instances, no precise precedent will be available in the tax
field. But presumably ownership of these items at date of inception
under local law will furnish a ~atisfactory standard to follow. Indeed,
Poe v. Seaborn seems to require use of this standard except possibly
where the spouses have attempted by anticipatory contract to alter the
character of community property as established by local law.
58
54

Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 at 46, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
Section 2(a), Mich. Pub. Acts (1947) No. 317.
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Deductions from ·gross income may also be a problem. Business
and nontrade or nonbusiness expenses, interest, taxes ,and charitable
gifts must be paid or incurred by the taxpayer.55 If these items are paid
during the taxable year by the husband from community funds and he
is acting within the scope of the management power's conferred on him
by'the community property law, the wife is entitled to one half of the
items as a deduction from her gross income. If the payment of the
husband is outside the scope of his management powers, the same result
would not seem to follow. For example, the Michigan act prohibits the ,husband from making gifts out of community funds without the consent of his wife.56 In the absence of evidence of her consent, presumably the wife would not be entitled to any deduction on account of the
gift since her position is roughly parallel to that of one who'se funds
have been misappropriated by another and' then used .to pay items
normally deductible for income tax purposes. It is an interesting speculation as to whether under such circumstances the wife has sustained a
deductible loss arising from "other casualty or from theft" 57 either at
the time of misappropriation or later when it develops that the husband
is financially unable to respond in an accounting between the spouses.
The wife is entitled to a deduction for one half of community debts
which became worthless during the year.58 And she is entitled to one
half of the deP,reciation allowance on community property used in the
trade or business, or community property held ,for the production of
income. 59 The same rule applies to depletion.60 The deduction for alimoney under section 23 (u), I.R.C. is confined by its terms to a husband
and, hence, r<;gardless of whether the husband may, under the community property law, have recourse to community funds to meet his
alimony obligations, his wife is not entitled to an alimony deduction.

III
THE LEGAL COMMUNITY; INCOME

TAX INCIDENT TO

-

ITS DISSOLUTION

The community•may be dissolved in whole or in part. The death
of either spouse or divorce a:ffects a complete dissolution of the community. ,But the spouses may, under section 8 of the Michigan act, by
I.R.C., § 23.
Section 6(c)(1), Mich. Pub. Acts (1947) No. 317.
57
See I.R.C., § 23(e).
.
58 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. IOI, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930), combined with the statute
[I.R.C., § 23(k)] requires this conclusion. The wife has a present vested interest
in the credit.
159
The wife sustains the depreciation loss since she has a vested ownership in the
property subject to depreciation.
60
See note 58, supra.
55
56
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joint action, effectively dissolve the community as respects any specific
item of property. Dissolution of the community by death of one of the
spouses has no income tax significance ~xcept as questions of the cost
basis of the community property in the hands of the surviving spouse
and the heirs of the deceased spouse arise. The cost basis to the surviving spouse of her interest in the community property is the cost of that
interest to the community at the time of acquisition prior to the death
of the deceased spouse.6'1 And this conclusion is unaffected by the fact
that the surviving spouse's interest in the community property may
have been subjected to estate tax as part of the deceased spouse's gross
estate.62 The cost basis of the deceased spouse's interest in community
property in the hands of his heirs is fair market value at the date of the
deceased spouse's death.68
Dissolution of the community in a specific piece of property by conveyances under section 8 of the act may result in taxable gain to one of
the spouses:64
Dissolution of the community in its entirety by divorce may have
income tax significance. Under section 12 of the act, the Michigan
courts are given broad discretionary powers to divide community property between the spouses as they shall deem just, proper and equitable.
Regardless of community property law, transfers by a husband to his
wife of property as an incident of divorce and in exchange for a release
by the wife ·of her marital rights, can result in taxable gain to the husband where the fair market value of the property transferred exceeds
its cost to the husband. 65 It is obvious that if the divorce court exercises
the powers conferred on it by section 12 and divides the community
property between the spouses other than equally, one of the spouses
will be the gainer. If there is injected into the situation a release by the
wife of her marital rigl,its, there is no apparent reason why the transaction should be treated any differently than other ex-changes between
the spouses.66
61 ''The basis of property shall be the cost of such property ••." I.R.C., § I I 3 (a).
The surviving spouse's interest does not fall within any of the exceptions appearing in
section 113(a), Internal Revenue Code. It is acquired by the surviving spouse although
it may be acquired through the efforts or agency of the deceased spouse as manager of
the community.
62
Although subjected to estate tax, the surviving spouse's interest is not properly
transmitted at death within the meaning of section n3(a)(5) Internal Revenue Code.
The interest is taxed to the decedent's estate not because he owned it but because he
controlled it.
68
The situation falls categorically within I.R.C., § 113(a)(5). ·
64
Johnson v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 125.
65
Commissioner v. Mesta, (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 986. Cf.
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 65 S. Ct. 655 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U.S. 303, 65 S. Ct. 652 (1945).
66
This conclusion seems to be required by Johnson v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th,
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IV
THE CONSENSUAL CoMMUNI'..fY As DISTINGUISHED FROM THE
LEGAL COMMUNITY

In Commissioner v. Harmon, the Supreme Court observed:
"Communities are of two sorts,-consensual and legal. A consensual comm1.1nity arises out of contract. It does not significantly
differ in origin or nature from such a status as was in question in
Lucas v. Earl. •.• In Poe v~ Seaborn •.. the court was µot dealing
with a consensual community but one made an incident of marriage by the inveterate policy of the state." 67
The courts of other community property states have lield that the
spouses may, by mutual declaration, convert future receipts which
would otherwise be the separate property of either into community
property as received and convert future receipts which would o~herwise be community property into separate property as received. es
There may be a question as to whether this view will prevail in Michigan,69 but it is assumed, for present purposes, that it will. Th1e use of
the anticipatory arrangement is a vital ingredient in the planning of
many taxpayers. In the not unusual case of a husband having large
salary from personal services and a wife having income from investments of equivalent amount, the effect of the community property law
is to increase the taxes of the family as a unit since the husband's salary
becomes community in character, whereas the wife's investment income
remains her separate property. The result is, that half of the husband's
salary is added to the wife's investment income 'and taxed in high surtax brackets. Presumably, in a situation of this kind, lawyers may advise
the execution of an anticipatory arrangement by which the spouses
agree that the husband's future salary for personal services shall be his
separate income. In some cases the parties may go even further in an
effort to attain maximum income tax advantages, as, for example, contracting that the husband's salary for personal services from the X
Corporation shall be his separate property, but that from the Y Corporation shall remain community property. If, as we have assumed,
these agreements ;1re, good under the Michigan community property
law, are they good for federal tax purposes? This involves a consideration of two quest~ons:
1943) 135 F. (2d) 125.
67
323 U.S. 44 at 46, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
88
Wren v. Wren, 100 Cal. 276, 34 P. 775 (1893); Volz v. Zeng, 113 Wash.
378, 194 P. 409 (1920); cf. Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S.W. (2d) 152
(1931).
.
69
There appears to be no express statutory sanction in the new act. Section 8
seems to refer to community interests in existing property.
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I. Are the arrangements consensual in nature as respects the·
items of income to which they refer with the result that they will
be disregarded entirely for income tax purposes? or
2. Are the arrangements consensual in character with respect
to the items of income to which they pertain with the result that
the community, generally speaking, is part consensual and part
legal in character, and is not a legal community to any extent
within the meaning 9f Poe v. Seaborn?

The Tax Court, circuit court and Treasury Rulings to date answer
both questions in the negative.70 But an examination of the Supreme
Court cases suggests storm · clouds on the horizon. Few will deny
Justice Douglas' remark that Lucas v. Earl and Poe v. Seaborn represent "competing theories of income tax liability." 71 In the former case,
Earl, a resident of California, entered into a contract with his wife
whereby he assigned to her an interest in all of his future earnings from
personal services. The issue submitted to the court was whether the
agreement should stand for income tax purposes. The court held that
it could not. A close reading of the opinion indicates that under California law the agreement between Earl and his wife may have been
valid and that half of Earl's earnings may have vested in his wife
without intermediate ownership in Earl, or, in the alternative, that the
case would have been decided in the same way if this were the California law.12 In Commissioner v. Harmon, which involved the status
of the first Oklahoma Community Property Statute for income tax
purposes, the court elected to follow Lucas v. Earl on the grounds that
the Oklahoma Statute contained an elective feature as a condition precedent to its application. Stated otherwise, the Oklahoma law was not
applicable unless the spouses agreed that it should be applicable. It
was said that this created a consensual community and that Lucas v.
Earl applied. The point made in the dissent was that the distinction
between Commissioner v. Harmon and Poe v. Seaborn was a distinction without a di:fference inasmuch as the spouses in any community
property state are free to contract their way out from under the law as
they see fit. The dissent assumed that anticipatory arrangements in the
\

70

Helvering v. Hickman, (C.C.A. 9th, 1934) 70 F. (2d) 985; Louis Gassner,
4 B.T.A. 107.1 (1926); Harry S. Goldberg, 4 B.T.A. 1073 (1926); Cecil B. DeMille, 31 B.T.A. 1161 (1935); G.C.M. 18884, 16 lNT. REv. BUL. (1937); G.C.M.
19248, 16 INT. REv. BuL. 59 (1937~.
71
Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 at 56, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
72
"There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them
and provid~ that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts
however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a
second in the man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute. . . ."
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I I I at 114, 115, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930).
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other community property states would not result in the creation of a
consensual community, either in whole or in part, for purposes of federal income tax law. And there is substantial authority for this assumption. 78 But it is a significant fact that in the majority opinion appears
the following pass~ge:
"We think it immaterial, for present purposes, that the community status may or may not be altered by· contract between the
parties, may or may not be avoided by antenuptial agreements, or
that certain assets of a spouse may or may not be classed as 'separate property' excluded from the, community." 74
It is perfectly plain that the unexercised power of the spouses to remove themselves, in whole or in part, from the operation of the com- ·
munity property law does not alter "their status as members of a legal
_ community.7" It is not at all clear whether the exercise of this power by
the spouses converts the legal community into a consensual community,
either in whole or in part. Unless the court answers this question in the
affirmative, the distinction between Commissioner v. Harmon and Poe
v. Seaborn is reminiscent of those "elusive and subtle casuistries" 76
which were forcefully consigned to oblivion in Helvering v. Hallock. 71
It is suggested that the court may ultimately hold that the exercise by
the spouses of their anticipatory powers destroys the legal community
and creates a consensual community governed by Lucas v. Earl and
Commissioner v. Harmon. Opposed to this view is the fact that Poe
v. Seaborn carried to its logical conclusion requires recognition of anticipatory agreements for tax purposes. -r:he answer to this is tha~ Lucas
v. Earl and Commissioner v. Harmon carried to their logical conclusion require an opposite result. In practical e:ffect, the court will be
called upon to define with some precision the line of demarcation between Poe v. Seaborn on the one hand, and Lucas v. Earl and Commissioner v. Harmon on the other. In cases where the spouses' position,
income-tax-wise, has been improved by the community property law,
but could be further improved by anticipatory arrangements of a selective character, counsel should weigh the possible action of the Supreme
Court before making any reco,mmendation.
78

See note 70, supra.
,
Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 at 48, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
75
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
.
76
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 at n8, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940}.
77 See note 76, supra.
74

